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Title: Is the Contingentist/Inevitabilist Debate a Matter of Degrees? 
 
Abstract: The contingentist/inevitabilist debate contests whether the results of successful 
science are contingent or inevitable. This paper addresses lingering ambiguity in the way 
contingency is defined in this debate. I argue that contingency in science can be understood 
as a collection of distinct concepts, distinguished by how they hold science contingent, by 
what elements of science they hold contingent, and by what those elements are contingent 
upon. I present a preliminary taxonomy designed to characterize the full range positions 
available and illustrate that these constitute a diverse array, rather than a spectrum. 
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1. Introduction 
Ian Hacking, in The Social Construction of What?, asks his readers to assign 
themselves a number from one to five to describe how central contingency is to their 
personal conceptions of science. If you rate yourself at one, then you are a strong 
inevitabilitst, whereas if you choose five, you are highly contingentist and probably have 
strong constructionist sympathies (Hacking 1999, 99). In response, Léna Soler questions 
whether this is the correct approach, asking: “should we introduce degrees of contingentism 
depending on the kind of contingent factors that are supposed to play a role?” (Soler 2008a, 
223). 
Herein, I answer Soler’s question in the emphatic affirmative, and therefore the 
question in the title with a resounding “no.” Contingency in science can be understood as a 
collection of distinct concepts, classifiable by how they hold science contingent, by what 
elements of science they hold contingent, and by what those elements are contingent upon. 
What separates one contingentist from another is not that one tags herself a two and the other 
fancies himself a five according to how strongly each believes science might have developed 
differently. They disagree about what factors produce contingency and about the aspects of 
the scientific process on which those factors act. Contingency is a “what” question, not a 
“how much” question. 
I begin, in Section 2, by reconstructing positions the central figures in the 
contingentist/inevitabilist (C/I) debate stake out. Ian Hacking, who coined the terms 
“contingentism” and “inevitabilism,” figures centrally. I also discuss scholars who were 
retrospectively cast as interlocutors in the debate, such as Andrew Pickering, Sheldon 
Glashow, and James Cushing, and those who responded to Hacking, namely Léna Soler and 
Howard Sankey. I argue that the conversation wants for a clear understanding of contingency 
and suggest how this ambiguity might be clarified by more rigorous classification of the 
concepts it groups together. 
Section 3 presents fresh taxonomy of contingency in science. The taxonomy builds on 
John Beatty’s distinction between unpredictability contingency and causal dependence 
contingency (Beatty 2006). This distinction clarifies the debate substantially; however, I 
argue that a second step is required. Further decomposing unpredictability contingency and 
classifying causal dependence contingency—based on the things within science considered to 
be contingent and the factors they are presumed to be contingent upon—allows more precise 
characterization of the views under discussion. A detailed picture of ways different authors 
use contingency makes it evident that a nuanced account of the concept can clarify some 
persistent ambiguities in the C/I debate. 
 
2. Contingency and Inevitability 
Ian Hacking coined “contingentism” and “inevitabilism” in the same book in which 
he hinted that contingency might be understood as a spectrum. Contingency is one feature of 
his effort to understand the philosophical stakes of social constructionism. Hacking casts 
contingency as a sticking point between constructionists and their opponents. He identifies 
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the constructionist program as seeking to undermine claims about the inevitability of science. 
When generalized, according to Hacking, the constructionist argument takes the form “X 
need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is, is not determined by the nature of things; 
it is not inevitable.” It often proceeds to two other more advanced stages, which contend a) 
that X is bad in its current form, and therefore b) should be eliminated or radically altered 
(Hacking 1999, 6). The constructionist program meets irreconcilable opposition from 
inevitabilists when it claims that the results of scientific investigation are contingent, and 
therefore unconstrained by the structure and properties of the natural world. 
Andrew Pickering, author of 1984’s Constructing Quarks, is Hacking’s paradigm 
contingentist. Pickering advances the view that high energy physics’ Standard Model resulted 
from an exegesis of data, which could have produced any one of numerous, ontologically 
incompatible interpretations. He concludes that physics might have escaped the twentieth 
century quark free, and that if it had, it would not be any less successful (Pickering 1984). 
Hacking interprets this argument in light of The Mangle of Practice (Pickering 1995), 
wherein Pickering argues that scientific consensus arises from negotiation between theory 
applied to the world, theory applied to instruments, and the construction of the instruments 
themselves to develop a robust fit with observed data. The results of science are contingent 
from this perspective because the negotiation could be carried out in any number of ways, 
each resulting in the same degree of self-described success. Pickering asserts that twentieth-
century physics could have been just as successful if, for example, cyclotrons had not 
supplanted traditional cloud-chamber technology and the resulting theory of the micro-world 
had not been dominated by quarks, which he contends are the peculiar progeny of the particle 
accelerator. 
Hacking elaborates the inevitabilist stance in “How Inevitable Are the Results of 
Successful Science?,” writing: “We ask: If the results R of a scientific investigation are 
correct, would any investigation of roughly the same subject matter, if successful, at least 
implicitly contain or imply the same results? If so, there is a significant sense in which the 
results are inevitable” (Hacking 2000, 61). Pickering would deny that equal success implies 
equivalence of any sort. By contrast, Hacking casts Sheldon Glashow as arch inevitabilist. 
Glashow holds that any investigation into the natural world starting from reasonable initial 
assumptions would produce not only the same answers, but also a similar set of questions to 
ask. Glashow imagines intelligent aliens as hypothetical scientists whose physical laws 
should be isomorphic with ours. In doing so, Hacking charges, Glashow tacitly makes crucial 
assumptions about the “reasonable” initial conditions necessary for alien science to produce 
the same results. How do we know, for example, that aliens would identify proton structure 
as an interesting question? Hacking segues from Glashow into the difficulties with strong 
inevitability claims: how stringent can the initial conditions get before the argument dissolves 
into tautology? If the inevitabilist asserts that a successful alternate scientific enterprise will 
produce the same results by stipulating that success requires asking the same questions, using 
the same instruments to observe the same entities, and starting from the same assumptions, 
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then we are left with the trivial observation that effectively identical scientific investigations 
produce effectively identical results (2000, 66). 
Pickering and Glashow represent extremes; Hacking seeks a middle way. His 
compromise locates contingency at the level of the questions scientists ask. It is contingent, 
he argues, which questions are “live.” Live questions are those that make sense within the 
contemporary theoretical framework. Once scientists satisfactorily answer a live question we 
can take that result to be inevitable in some meaningful sense, but we have no guarantee that 
it would have been asked in the first place.1 Contingency, for Hacking, enters into science by 
allowing historical and socio-cultural factors to define what questions scientists find 
interesting and what questions they are permitted to ask. These questions are not necessarily 
answerable, and they might not make sense in any theory-independent sense, but once nature 
proves forthcoming with an answer, that answer has the tinge of inevitability. Science could 
have developed differently, but only because it could have addressed a different set of 
questions. Possible alternate results are never logically incompatible with current successful 
science (2000, 71). 
When distinguishing contingency from inevitability, Hacking observes the debate’s 
independence from the realism/anti-realism issue: “the contingency thesis itself is perfectly 
consistent with […] scientific realism, and indeed anti-realists […] might dislike the 
contingency thesis wholeheartedly,” (Hacking 1999, 80). Howard Sankey (2008) maintains 
the same separation. He defends weak fallibilism, consistent with an inevitabilist viewpoint, 
holding that individual results of science are contingent—individual instances of scientific 
investigation are fallible—but we can be confident that statistically inevitabilist tendencies 
will wash out local contingencies. 
Sankey defends his fallabilist stance’s compatibility with a contingency thesis, which 
he presents as an epistemic claim about scientific practice and the way investigators engage 
with the world: “Scientist might collect different evidence from the evidence they in fact do 
collect. They might have developed different instruments and techniques from the ones 
which have been developed and put to use” (Sankey 2008, 259). A geological example, the 
discovery of continental drift, illustrates his point: “The epistemic situation is […] dependent 
on contingent factors such as the availability of evidence and relevant knowledge, the 
development of instrumentation and the provision of research funding” (2008, 262). 
Sankey’s contingency differs from both Pickering’s and Hacking’s. Pickering would not 
contest that the factors Sankey identifies are contingent, but he would compile a list of 
additional contingencies much longer than Sankey would admit. Hacking argues for 
contingency of form rather than content of science: difference without incompatibility. 
Sankey points to the empirical content of science as contingent. These perspectives are not 
                                                
1 Hacking does not offer an account of how scientists can determine when a live question has 
been adequately answered, an issue that is not unproblematic (see Galison 1987). 
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incompatible, but they have different emphases—Sankey focuses on evidence, Hacking on 
inquiry. 
Sankey subtly contrasts James Cushing, who argues that contingency has an 
“ineliminable role in the construction and selection of a successful scientific theory from 
among its observationally equivalent and unrefuted competitors” (Cushing 1994, xi). 
Cushing uses “theory” equivocally, as his prime example is the choice between Bohr’s and 
Bohm’s interpretations of quantum mechanics, which can be construed as competing window 
dressings of the theory of quantum mechanics rather than as theories themselves. Quibbling 
aside, Cushing argues that choices between observationally equivalent alternatives are 
contingent. He does not claim that such choices are irrational, but that they are guided by 
philosophical and other external criteria. In the case of Bohm versus Bohr, the interpretive 
question hinges on whether one abandons strict determinacy or strict locality in the quantum 
realm. Evidence suggests that either particles in quantum states, obeying the probabilities 
assigned by their wave functions, assume classically observable values for their innate 
properties—charge, spin etc.—during an observation event, or some “hidden variables” 
determine these properties, but instantaneous signaling across finite distances is permitted. 
The first violates an ingrained philosophical preference for deterministic processes in 
physics, while the second flouts a storied tradition of skepticism about instantaneous action at 
a distance. Cushing’s view, exemplified by the claim that the Bohmian program’s defeat at 
the hands of Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation was contingent, involves no change in the 
empirical content of the theories in question. Nor does Cushing’s contingency act on the data 
collection process—the crux of Sankey’s argument. 
Most who deploy contingency do so in pursuit of goals other than defining it. Sankey, 
for instance, wants to show the independence of the C/I debate from discussions of realism. 
Léna Soler identifies this argument as a premature, writing: “the ‘contingentism versus 
inevitabilism’ contrast does not exist as an autonomous, well identified issue of 
significance,” (Soler 2008b, 232). On the basis of this ambiguity she sets out to clarify the 
issue, employing a thought experiment involving two, isolated communities of physicists, 
starting with the same initial conditions, asking their own questions, unguided by the work of 
the other scientists:  
Human beings might have succeeded in developing a physics as successful and 
progressive as ours, and yet asked completely different physical questions from the 
ones that have actually been asked, with the result that the accepted answers—in 
other words the content of the accepted physical theories and experimentally 
established physical facts—would be at the same time robust and different from ours. 
(2008b, 232) 
Any non-trivial contingency, Soler contends, requires that two isolated scientific 
communities starting from the same point produce “irreducibly different” results, while still 
satisfying a reasonable set of criteria for success (2008b, 232). 
Soler’s contingency involves deep and irreconcilable oppositions between competing 
physical theories. Given the constancy of the initial conditions in Soler’s thought experiment, 
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it tests only whether science is contingent irrespective of the initial conditions, and does not 
consider to what extent science might be contingent upon antecedent conditions.2 Soler’s 
thought experiment does not assess the relative contributions of contingency to the collection 
of internal and external factors that influence the trajectory of science. 
Each scholar mentioned here asks how science might be contingent. In doing so, each 
employs a different understanding of what contingency means and at what point the claim 
becomes meaningful. They cast contingency in a qualitatively different ways rather than with 
differing intensities, representing diversity of kind, not of degree: 
Hacking: Scientists might have asked different questions. 
Pickering: Scientists might have identified different ontological entities. 
Glashow: The core theoretical structure of science could not have been different. 
Sankey: Scientists might have identified alternate data sets or used different 
techniques. 
Cushing: Scientists could have arbitrated between empirically equivalent theories in 
other ways. 
Soler: Science could have been meaningfully different only if it has available at 
least two equally successful, but irreducibly different paths from any given 
starting point. 
A smooth scale of contingentism cannot capture these differences, even superficially. The 
next section systematizes the diversity of views sheltered within the contingency concept. 
 
3. Taxonomizing Contingency 
3.1. A Preliminary Distinction 
Contingency, as philosophical concept, is wildly diverse. How can we refine our 
understanding of contingency so it can be applied with less ambiguity? John Beatty offers a 
key distinction between “contingent per se” and “contingent upon” (Beatty 2006). “Per se” 
contingency describes stochasticity in the historical process; it implies that the process of 
history itself is unpredictable. “Upon” contingency requires no unpredictability, but rather 
describes a historical process that is far from robust with respect initial conditions, indicating 
that outcomes are causally dependent on the relevant antecedent factors. Any change in 
initial conditions could lead to a different outcome, even if the outcome of the process is, in 
principle, predictable from any given set of initial conditions.  
In drawing this distinction, Beatty invokes Stephen J. Gould’s thought experiment: 
restart biological evolution from the Cambrian explosion, and ask whether “replaying the 
tape” in this way would direct the history of life down a different path (Gould 1989). Gould 
argues that evolution is highly contingent, and the rerun would differ dramatically from the 
                                                
2 Here is an implicit distinction between “contingent per se” and “contingent upon,” which 
comes from Beatty (2006). See Section 3 below. 
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initial broadcast. As Beatty observes, Gould alternates between the unpredictability and 
causal dependence senses of contingency, sometimes postulating small changes in 
Precambrian conditions, sometimes not. Beatty argues that these two conceptions are 
compatible, but have different consequences for our understanding of historical processes. 
How should recognizing the distinction between these two varieties of contingency 
inform the C/I debate? Take Pickering: his claim that physics might have proceeded in a 
direction that did not include quarks is an unpredictability claim about scientific knowledge. 
He holds there that scientific knowledge is contingent per se. His view as reinterpreted by 
Hacking is an “upon” contingency claim. If the response to new data is a negotiation between 
existing theories, auxiliary theories about instruments, and the instruments themselves, then 
the consequent theory is contingent upon each of those three factors. In the second version of 
the argument, Pickering’s stance gets its bite from the factors it identifies as causally relevant 
rather than from the raw unpredictability of the scientific process. 
Hacking, Soler, and Sankey, all observe that even the strongest inevitabilist admits 
that a benign form of historical contingency shapes the course of science. The Bragg family 
might have gone into sheep shearing rather than physics, and the resulting disturbance in the 
development of x-ray crystallography would likely have substantially altered the story of the 
discovery of DNA’s structure. The Cold War might have dragged on a few years longer, the 
United States Congress might have been friendlier towards basic research expenditures, the 
Superconducting Super Collider might have been built, and the Higgs boson might have been 
identified earlier, and in the United States rather than Europe. In Beatty’s language, 
inevitabilists are happy with the claim that scientific knowledge is contingent upon some 
historical factors, while denying the stronger claim that it is contingent per se. 
Beatty’s distinction substantially clarifies disagreements between inevitabilists and 
contingentists. They do not disagree about the extent to which scientific knowledge is 
contingent; they disagree about what kind of contingency influences the scientific process. 
Contingentists, as described by Hacking, admit both unpredictability and causal dependence 
contingency, while inevitabilists see no trouble from some types of causal dependence 
contingency, but draw the line at its more consequential sibling. This distinction does not 
exhaust the possible positions in the contingency debate. It demonstrates that Hacking’s 
method of rating contingency on a spectrum inadequately describes the commitments 
involved, but it only begins to capture the full range contingency claims available. Those 
who allow causal dependence contingency might have reasonable disagreements about what 
aspects of science are subject to contingency claims and what science can be reasonably said 
to be contingent upon. 
 
3.2. Towards a Taxonomy of Contingency 
Beatty’s categories can be decomposed further. First, consider unpredictability 
contingency. Beatty defines it as the belief that “the occurrence of a particular prior state is 
insufficient to bring about a particular outcome,” (Beatty 2006, 339). It appears that the 
unpredictability contingentist makes a strong metaphysical claim about the historical process: 
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it is indeterministic. Indeed, Gould does appear to be making such indeterminacy claims. 
Should we replay the tape of life from the exact same initial conditions and get a different 
result, then the process by which life develops exhibits intrinsic stochasticity. 
Indeterminacy is not, however, the only way to understand per se contingency. Beatty 
observes that contingency is the lynchpin of Gould’s argument that selection should not be 
the only causal agent evolutionary biologists invoke to explain the features and behaviors of 
present-day organisms (see Gould and Lewontin 1979). This suggests that unpredictability, 
as applied to contingency, can be understood as a methodological argument. This weaker 
understanding would suggest that outcomes are contingent (per se) with respect to some 
specified set of causal factors. It does not rule out the ability of other causal factors to 
provide an exhaustive, deterministic explanation. In fact, it often suggests such factors. To 
wit, Gould’s case against what he calls pan-selectionism—the assumption that selection can 
be invoked to explain any feature of an organism. The weaker version of unpredictability 
contingency he employs suggests that the features of organisms are contingent 
(unpredictable) with respect to selection effects. Such a view is consistent with deterministic 
evolution; it merely implies that factors other than selection are partly responsible. 
The strong version of unpredictability contingency, which I call indeterminist 
contingency, implies randomness in the historical process. The weaker version, 
incompleteness contingency, claims that some set of causal factors is inadequate to explain a 
given process, and that outcomes are unpredictable with respect to that set of factors. These 
two forms do different types of philosophical work. Indeterminist contingency says 
something about how the world is. Incompleteness contingency brands a set of explanatory 
tools inadequate, and so depends on the state of scientific practice and must refer to 
established explanatory orthodoxy. 
Causal-dependence contingency is a more complicated case than unpredictability 
because the objects of “upon” might be expounded ad nauseam. The first step towards a 
classification requires identifying suitably distinct parts of science that might be held 
contingent. Science, like contingency, is heterogeneous and the claim that science is 
contingent can mean different things depending on what parts of science that claim specifies. 
Science makes ontological claims, formulates methodological procedures, develops models, 
adopts interpretations, and builds communities. Causal dependence contingency can be 
initially differentiated based on which of these many aspects of science are claimed 
contingent. With the caveat that the boundaries are fluid and that the reader may wish to alter 
or supplement the list, I propose five categories: 
(1) Trivial contingency – Science is part of a historical process, and so is contingent 
in the same way human history is contingent. This weak claim supposed that the 
details of scientists’ everyday existences might have been different. 
All non-Laplacian determinists are happy to admit this form of contingency. A claim 
that science is contingent in the trivial sense, however, offers the hard-boiled contingentist 
little succor. Trivial contingency is agnostic about the aspects of science that are typically of 
interest to philosophers, and so has little bearing on the debate. This type of contingency is 
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2013 
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) 
Please use DOI when citing or quoting 
  
frequently invoked to argue that contingency need not be repugnant to the sophisticated 
inevitabilist. Sankey, for instance, argues that continental drift did not gain traction within the 
geology community until the 1950s and 1960s, when the U.S. Department of Naval Research 
began funding ocean floor research to bolster its submarine program (Sankey 2008, 262). 
Naturally, if the research had not been funded, and had not been conducted, the trajectory 
taken by the science would have been different, but this does not bear on the claim that 
successful science should pass through stages resembling ours. Trivial contingency alters the 
route science takes, but remains silent about its destination. 
(2) Sociocultural contingency – The social structures that constitute scientific 
activity and science’s interaction with culture might have been different. 
At first glance this is a slightly stronger, but similarly innocuous, form of 
contingency. Like trivial contingency, it is agnostic about the content of science, acting 
instead on institutions, disciplines, communities, political processes, and research cultures. It 
is more complicated than trivial contingency, however, because it is the point where some 
strong contingentists dig in their heels. Forms of contingency that cut closer to the bone (see 
below) often rest on social determinism. A contingentist claiming that theoretical entities are 
contingent upon (causally determined by) social structures might want to deny that those 
social structures are themselves contingent. Similarly, inevitabilists might flinch when 
sociocultural contingency is used in conjunction with a stronger form, as in, for example, the 
controversial Forman thesis, which asserts that quantum indeterminacy was contingent upon 
the distinctive social conditions of the Weimar Republic (Forman 1971). 
(3) Methodological contingency – The way in which we do science might have been 
different. This moderately weak variety questions the inevitability of 
experimental and theoretical techniques, laboratory practice, instruments, 
apparatus, and heuristic devices. 
Contingency claims frequently target the way science functions. Sankey approximates 
this version of contingency when he describes evidence collection and instrumentation as 
sources of contingency and claims that the development of plate tectonics could only come 
about when specific instrumentation came into common use (Sankey 2008). Many historical 
studies have examined how tool selection influences the way theories develop. The literature 
on model organisms provides an example. Robert Kohler’s Lords of the Fly contends that the 
choice of drosophila melanogaster as the model organism for experimental genetics shaped 
the field’s development (Kohler 1994). Experimental apparatus influences the collection, 
packaging, and inflection of data, while the available mathematics, heuristics, and analogies 
guide how that data is analyzed. This type of contingency is not trivial, but it does not 
directly imply incompatibilities between existing science and science that might have 
proceeded with different experimental or analytical tools. As with sociocultural contingency 
it can be combined with more potent forms. 
(4) Interpretive contingency – The way scientists expound data in order to fill 
theoretical gaps might happen in a number of ways. 
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Understanding theoretical implications requires interpreting data, which, even if they 
motivate a particular theory, often do not compel one interpretation of that theory. Take 
Cushing’s claim about the contingency of the Copenhagen interpretation: Quantum 
mechanics allows multiple logically consistent interpretations of what happens when 
quantum systems are observed. A satisfying ontological explanation requires physicists to 
interpret measurements that, by the very nature of the theory, do not provide the whole story. 
Given this necessary appeal to factors other than data, the interpretation we choose is 
contingent upon the context in which the theory emerges, and an alternate interpretation 
might well have emerged given different conditions (Cushing 1994). 
(5) Theoretical contingency – In the constructionist mold, this strong form holds that 
scientific theories themselves and the claims they make about the world might 
have been different. 
This form postulates deep incompatibility between two possible scientific trajectories. 
While theoretical contingency can be parsed in “upon” syntax, it approximates a per se claim. 
The main difference between theoretical contingency and the in-principle unpredictability of 
scientific results is the frequent postulation by its advocates of a causal arrow from specific 
historical or cultural factors to theories. Forman’s argument that cultural instability in the 
Weimar Republic compelled physicists to accept indeterminacy, for instance, makes quantum 
mechanics’ ontological claims contingent upon the Weimar cultural environment (Forman 
1971). This is not the same as describing science as unpredictable, but the factors on which it 
is contingent make the claim equivalent with the incompleteness contingency claim that 
science is unpredictable from internal factors alone. The per se claim and the theoretical 
contingency claim often go hand in hand, as the argument often holds that theoretical 
contingency works because theory is either almost infinitely malleable (indeterminist), 
and/or subject to underappreciated pressures (incompleteness). 
This taxonomy might seem spectral, given a description beginning with “trivial” and 
graduating into increasingly more serious claims, but the relationships between the elements 
are not so straightforward. Trivial contingency does not require a commitment to any of the 
other four, and theoretical contingency might imply several others a fortiori, but middle-of-
the-road contingency claims are not so easily ranked. It would be consistent to hold an 
inevitabilist stance about methodology, arguing that mature science motivates an optimal 
form of investigation and modeling, while maintaining interpretive contingency. It would be 
equally consistent to be inevitabilist about interpretation while contingentist about 
methodology. These examples elucidate why contingency is a “what sort” question as 
opposed to a “how much” question. If I claim that one part of the scientific process is 
contingent while holding that another is not, that alone does not make me more or less 
contingent than I would be if I held the inverse view. 
The categories above provide only half the picture. To complete the taxonomy a 
second layer is required. Distinctions based on what parts of science are contingent are 
critical, but we can also, invoking Beatty, draw further distinctions based on what they 
consider those factors to be contingent upon. Thus, while two people might agree that the 
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methodological components of science are contingent, they might also disagree substantively 
about the factors upon which methodology is contingent. The factors upon which science, in 
all its aspects, might be contingent map onto the aspects that can themselves be held 
contingent: everyday events, sociocultural contexts, methods, interpretations, theories. 
 
4. Summary 
I have argued that the debate between contingentists and inevitabilists can be recast as 
an array of positions that directly oppose one another only over a small range of their total 
implications. Within the framework provided by Beatty, I have decomposed contingency into 
seven types, two under unpredictability and five under causal dependence. Each of these 
latter five might be further decomposed based on the “upon” relation of the contingency in 
question. These views of contingency can be held alone or in conjunction with others, and 
each combination constitutes a distinct position, carrying different assumptions about how 
science engages with the natural world. 
Statements that science is contingent or inevitable are cumbersome when not 
identifying the area of science on which that property acts and specifying how that property 
operates within it. Science might be interpretively contingent without being methodologically 
contingent. It might be both without being theoretically contingent. Many processes scaffold 
knowledge production. Contingency may enter through many doors; it will adopt a different 
character, with different consequences, when entering through each. The framework I have 
outlined demonstrates how science can be considered contingent and inevitable in 
qualitatively different ways and exposes assumptions about the causal structure of the 
scientific process that would otherwise remain implicit. 
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